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Abstract
As the Hispanic community becomes increasingly important in American politics there are competing
views about whether they can be converted to the Republican Party. One perspective argues that
Hispanics’ religion and traditional social values makes them natural constituents of the Republican
Party. Alternatively, Hispanics are primarily concerned about issues promoting their well-being, while
topics such as moral values or religion are private. I use a novel approach to test whether traditional
social values might attract Hispanic voters to the Republican Party. Using exit poll results for ballot
propositions on moral issues from Arizona, Colorado, and Florida I find weak evidence that traditional
values will convert Hispanics to the Republican Party. Instead, the results indicate that traditional social
values issues reinforce the polarization between the two parties. 1
Keywords: Hispanic, Republican Party, moral values, referenda

Introduction
There is widespread agreement about the increasing importance of the Hispanic
population in American politics. The size of the Hispanic community is estimated to increase
121% between 2010 and 2050; soon the United States will be a majority-minority nation (Frey
2015). Generally, Hispanic voters have preferred Democratic over Republican Party candidates.
For example, in 2012 Barack Obama received 71% of the Hispanic vote compared to only 27%
for Mitt Romney. Hillary Clinton received 66% of the Hispanic vote and Donald Trump
received 28% in the 2016 election. This is partially related to immigration’s salience in American
politics that seems to divide both political parties and large segments of the Hispanic and white
populations. The hostility towards immigration by many Republicans, personified by Donald
Trump’s disparaging characterizations, doubtlessly alienates many Hispanic voters. A second
explanation offered is that the rapid growth of the Latino population motivates some white
voters to align with the Republican Party in opposition to immigration which, in turn moves
Latino voters to the Democrat Party. Also important are the different party positions on issues
basic to opportunity such as education, health care, and jobs.
Yet some conservatives believe Hispanics’ religiosity and embrace of traditional values
are opportunities for the Republican Party to attract converts—perhaps not a majority of
Hispanic voters but enough to offset their losses in recent elections. George W. Bush often said,
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“Family values don’t stop at the Rio Grande and a hungry mother will try to feed her child.” (The
Growth and Opportunity Project 2013). In other words, according to the Republican National
Committee, President Bush's statement communicated to Hispanics that he cared about them
and their future. In return, George W. Bush received 40% of the Hispanic vote in 2004 which is
seen as evidence of the possibility that when a temperate posture, moral values, and national
security concerns are communicated to Latinos then their voting decisions makes them similar
to other Republican-leaning voters (Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler 2008).
Can Hispanics really be convinced to adopt the Republican Party? A large percentage of
the Hispanic population is either Catholic or evangelical Protestant. These faith traditions tend
to favor traditional religious and social values. The Republican Party’s long-standing opposition
to abortion and same-sex marriage, support for religious liberty, and promotion of the family—
it is argued—should be attractive to many Hispanic voters. Following their loss in 2012, the
Republican National Committee admonished its membership to be less offensive and more
inclusive as well as appeal to traditional values in order to attract Latino support (Growth and
Opportunity Project 2013). Yet alternatively, perhaps social values issues are less consequential
than immediate concerns such as jobs, health care, education, and immigration.
I find weak evidence at best indicating that appeals to traditional values are sufficiently
strong to persuade Hispanic voters to join the Republican Party. Specifically, I argue that Latino
voters appear to separate issues into public and private domains. Issues touching upon moral
values lie inside Latinos’ personal domain. Latinos may hold traditional attitudes regarding social
values but prefer government and politicians to refrain from acting in these areas (Barreto and
Segura 2014). Conversely, issues of personal well-being such as education, jobs, health care, and
immigration are appropriately in the public domain and suitable for political action. The
Republican Party should not count on attracting large numbers of Latinos based upon the party’s
values positions—at least not until bread and butter issues are first satisfied.
Partisan Identification, Moral Values, and Issues of Personal Well-Being
The political significance of the Hispanic community is realized as America’s largest and
most rapidly growing minority. Furthermore, Hispanics are becoming an increasingly important
component of the Democratic Party’s coalition. Some argue that the growing Hispanic
population—especially in states such as Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Arizona, and New
Mexico—will eventually contribute to a long-lasting Democratic majority (Oakford 2015;
Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). The competition for the loyalties of Hispanic voters though should
be understood partially through the theoretical perspective of partisan identification and
understanding which issues matters most to them.
The classic interpretation of partisan identification views membership as a foundational
orientation acquired early in voters’ lives (Campbell 1961). Individuals gain their political
orientation from their parents, it strengthens over time, and is resistant to change. Further,
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individuals’ social and economic attributes reinforce their partisan and political predispositions.
Since partisan loyalty is inherited at a young age then it exists prior to political experiences.
Partisanship shapes how policy issues and problems, political information, messages, and
candidates are perceived. Later scholars find that party identification exhibits more volatility—
at least in the short-term—than the classicists concluded. Citizens’ partisan attachments can
exhibit short-term change in response to evaluations of economic conditions (Fiorina 1981;
Kiewiet 1983), foreign policy crises, and other salient political events which can produce
considerable fluctuation in individuals’ partisan loyalties at particular moments (MacKuen,
Erikson, Stimson 1989). Nevertheless, the partisan changes identified by recent scholarship still
tend to be small movements; wholesale partisan realignments of the electorate are rare.
Perhaps Hispanic preferences operate differently from those of whites and African
Americans even when social and economic factors are controlled (Claussen 2004). Instead,
different life experiences, separate national origins, and social identities might better explain the
political opinions of immigrant groups (Alvarez and Beddola 2003; Kinder and White 2000). In
other words, many Latinos’ partisan attachments are politically and contextually shaped by their
experiences after arriving in the United States. This leads some to see Latinos available to acquire
an allegiance to the Republican Party because they have not yet adopted strong partisan loyalties.
Consequently, since partisan inheritance is weak then the cues and messages appealing to
fundamental values delivered to Latinos can be instrumental in cultivating their partisan identity.
It is within this context that competition for Hispanic loyalty becomes politically
consequential. The traditional interpretation asserts that partisan identification is a prism
through which political reality is interpreted. For Hispanics and other recent immigrants,
political events and salient policy issues such as immigration may ‘push’ weakly aligned new
migrants to one of the political parties because many have no American partisan inheritance to
pass down (Bowler, Segura, Nicholson 2006; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Important policy
positions might influence Latino partisan identification more than ideology or demographic
factors such as education or income (Nicholson and Segura 2005; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005).
Since their partisan inheritance is weaker compared to others then their experiences with the
state and the appeals by parties and their candidates potentially can exert significant influence on
their choices (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). Abrajano and Alvarez (2011), for instance, find that
many Hispanics who identify as Democrats do not consider themselves ideologically liberal. In
other words, many Hispanic Democrats do not equate their partisanship with an ideology as is
typical of Anglo voters although Hispanics who identify with the Republican Party think of
themselves a little more as conservatives. Hence, the relationship between ideology and political
party is weaker for Hispanics compared to the rest of the American electorate. Nor are classic
demographic factors such as education and income levels strong predictors of Hispanic
partisanship (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011).
What replaces ideology and personal demographic characteristics as predictors of
Hispanic partisanship? National origin, age and length of residency in the United States,
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inclusion into communities, and issues that directly impact their daily life appear to be important
sources of partisan affect. Issues of immediate concern such as access to education, jobs, health
care, and the parties’ positions on immigration are important predictors of Democratic
identification. Thus, Hispanic partisan preference may be more dynamic and nuanced compared
to the generally stable party identifications of Anglos; it is potentially receptive to the overtures
and appeals of the parties.
Another explanation for the Hispanic lean to the Democratic Party is offered through
the dynamics of dramatic demographic change and its resulting polarization. Traditional
applications of conflict theory argue that significant demographic change often produces anxiety
by the majority [white] population. As the Latino community grows a heightened sense of threat
is experienced by many white voters who move to the Republican Party (Hajnal and Abrajano
2015; Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Barreto and Segura 2014; Teixeira, Frey, Griffin 2015). The
feeling of threat can be ignited by local elites who serve as issue entrepreneurs (Gulasekaram and
Ramakrishnan 2015). For example, Republican Governor Pete Wilson’s advocacy of Proposition
187 in California rallied some white voters to the perceived threat posed by immigration (Bowler,
Nicholson and Segura 2006; Monogan and Doctor 2017). In response to the heightened fear and
perhaps its exploitation by political leaders states often adopt restrictive immigration policies.
Hispanic voters may be repelled away from the (Republican) party sponsoring hostile legislation
and conversely embrace the (Democratic) party proposing policy positions that are less
threatening and aligned with their preferences. Given these factors potentially affecting Hispanic
partisan identity, can Republican appeals to religious and traditional values offset the losses
attributed to antagonistic posturing, harsh immigration positions, and an agenda of lower taxes
and personal liberty?
Can Cultural Values Bring Hispanics to the Republican Party?
Given the lean toward the Democratic Party by Hispanics over the past 25 years is there
evidence that socially conservative values might offer the Republican Party some hope? A large
literature establishes the movement of religious conservatives to the Republican Party (Kellstedt
1994; Layman 1997b; Green, Guth, Smidt, Kellstedt 1996). Indicators of religious conservatism
such as frequent church or worship service attendance, biblical literalism, and born-again
experiences predispose individuals towards the Republican Party. Further, the Republican Party
intentionally recruited religiously conservative voters through specific policy appeals which
bridge traditional religious and cultural values. The so-called ‘Culture Wars’ of the 1990s and
early 2000s were waged over issues including abortion, gay rights, and contraception. 2

Morris Fiorina, though, questions whether a ‘Culture War’ exists in the United States. He believes the majority
of the American population hold centrist opinions on most issues. The source of polarization is ideologically
extreme elites offer radical policy alternatives to the public. (2011).

2
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The possibility to attract Hispanics is seen by both the Republican Party organization as
well as by conservative intellectuals. Strategists acknowledge the Democratic advantage but
contend the Republican Party can and must broaden its appeal to Hispanic voters. They argue
Republican positions on traditional religious and cultural/family values, and the large percentage
of Latinos who are Christian are attractive to many Hispanic voters; Latino social conservatism
predisposes many to adopt the Republican Party. Thus, the Republican National Committee
after the 2012 presidential election acknowledged the need to soften its “unwelcoming” rhetoric.
“The RNC must improve how it markets its core principles and message in Hispanic
communities (especially in Hispanic faith-based communities)” (Growth and Opportunity
Project 2013). George W. Bush was able to win 40% of the Latino vote because of his softer
rhetoric and using family values as a broad appeal to sympathetic Hispanic voters. Frequent
attendance at worship service or being ’born again’ reinforces traditional religious values which
in turn, strengthens conservative (i.e., Republican) attachment. Indeed, according to the 2008
national exit poll 80% of Hispanics identified as Catholic or belonging to another Christian
denomination. Approximately 38% of Hispanics attend church or worship service at least once
per week and 34% acknowledge being born again. Indicators of religious identity and
commitment, therefore, seem to offer an opening for the Republican Party to increase its
Hispanic support.
Writing in National Affairs—a conservative thought journal—Mike Gonzalez (2014)
advances an intellectual agenda for the Republican Party to attract Hispanic voters. Gonzalez
argues that Hispanics became a Democratic constituency for three related reasons. When the
Census Bureau classified Hispanic as a “minority” in the 1960s a particular identity was created
that fostered a view of “persecution.” Second, Great Society programs encouraged Hispanics to
become consumers of government social benefits. And finally, the “countercultural revolution of
the 1960s eroded Hispanics’ family traditions and values . . .” (118). The Republican Party can
attract Hispanics by emphasizing the importance of traditional family values and structures as
well as the virtue of climbing the social hierarchy similar to the paths followed by the Scots-Irish
and Roman Catholics decades ago.
Barreto and Segura (2014) though argue that while Latinos are religious, particular issues
dominate their decision calculus. They find that Latinos are primarily concerned about matters
affecting their personal well-being such as immigration, jobs, health care, and education. Latinos
separate issues between their personal and political identities. Latinos overwhelmingly reject
abortion but believe politicians and government should refrain from being involved in these types
of issues. Conversely, many Latinos view job opportunity, expanded educational access, and
health care are appropriate policies for elected officials. Unlike other religious traditionalists,
Latino voters appear to differentiate between the political/public domain and personal space that
is reserved for moral issues. Perceptions of political parties’ ability to solve the issues important
to voters are consequential for partisan affection and analysis suggests that Latinos see the
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Democratic Party as better able to respond to their policy preferences (Nicholson and Segura
2005).
Data and Methods
This research uses a novel approach to examine whether Hispanic voters can be attracted to
the Republican Party through their religiosity and family values. I examine support for ballot
initiatives that advanced family value outcomes in Arizona, Colorado, and Florida from 1996
through 2008 as a test of these competing interpretations. During this time several states
proposed referenda prohibiting gay marriage or imposing new restrictions on abortion. Ballot
initiatives offer several unique advantages. Ballot propositions simplify a voter’s decision calculus
because citizens do not need to figure out which candidate/party is closest to their overall ideal
preference point. Ballot measures allow voters to express their sincere policy preference without
considering the influences of candidate characteristics, the tradeoffs among a host of other policy
positions held by candidates, or the implications for the balance of power in an assembly. Further,
the referenda permit Latinos to express their preference for policies advancing traditional values
without voting for a Republican Party that may be perceived as hostile to immigrants or
instrumentally using pro-family rhetoric. Second, 1996 – 2008 is a period when ‘moral values’
are a strong theme in Republican presidential campaigns and are becoming a visible component
of their coalition. The Republican Party successfully attracts social conservatives during this
period. If there is a context when Hispanics could be drawn by the appeal of moral values, then
the selected ballot initiatives during this time frame provide a straightforward test. Finally, this
period precedes the intense polarization over immigration and disturbing caricatures of Latinos
used by some politicians today. Indeed, this is an interval largely distinguished by “compassionate
conservatism” and temperate language. Therefore, the potential pull of traditional values on
Latinos’ preferences on referenda are less jumbled by the contemporary hostility of the
Republican Party.
The selected states experienced substantial increases in their Hispanic populations in the
period. There is a total of seven instances of ballot initiatives concerning moral values or
indicators of religiosity between 1996 and 2008 in these three states. This provides separate tests
of our proposition whether Hispanics distinguish between issues located in their personal and
public spheres, displayed in Table 1. If family values occur in their public, (i.e., political, domain)
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then it is a relatively easy choice for these concerned voters to support the ballot proposals and
express affect for the Republican Party.
Contemporary research on the Hispanic population typically relies on national level
surveys. The American National Election studies and the General Social Surveys are nationally
recognized resources but provide a limited sample of Hispanic respondents which limits
subgroup and state-level analysis. A further limitation of national surveys is high-growth
Hispanic states do not fall within a distinct region as is the case when studying race in the South.
Even large-N surveys of Latino respondents such as the PEW National Hispanic Survey or the
Latino National Survey can produce small samples when controlling for citizenship status and
numerous variables included in models. To overcome these problems, we use the state-level
results from the General Election Pool for each presidential election from 1996–2008. 3 A
potential limitation of exit surveys is they typically ask voters a slightly smaller battery of
questions compared to the national surveys. This means that some equations used to estimate the
behavior of Hispanic and white voters are possibly slightly under-identified. At the same time,
exit polls offer several valuable advantages. First, exit polls provide a satisfactory Hispanic sample
within each state for each election that permits subgroup analysis. Second, the 12-year time span
allows for an analysis of trend prior to the prominence of immigration on the public agenda. 4 Is
there evidence of the Hispanic population’s movement towards the Democratic Party prior to
immigration becoming a national issue? Also exit polls give a profile of the ‘true’ voting public.
They recreate the ‘real’ electorate in each election and provide a good explanation for why citizens
voted the way they did. Exit polls, too, are used by many significant scholars to study Hispanic
political behavior reflecting their usefulness. 5
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, can we detect the Latino community organizing
behind the Democratic Party in our selected states? We expect to see the greatest drift toward
the Democratic Party in Arizona and moderate patterns in Colorado and Florida. Latino voters
are the least likely to display Republican sympathies in a hostile state like Arizona, but they may
be more open to moral issues in Colorado and Florida where their experience with the state is
We use exit polls from Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International. Sponsor: National Election Pool (ABC
News/Associated Press/CBS News/CNN/Fox News/NBC News) and from Voter News Service. Voter News
Service General Election Exit Polls, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
The Arizona data files were obtained from the Roper organization.

3

4

There are no ballot initiatives concerning moral values in states with high Hispanic growth rates after 2008.

National Election Pool exit polls have been used by many scholars to study Latino voting behavior. For example,
see Abrajano, Marisa, R. Michael Alvarez, and Jonathan Nagler 2008. “The Hispanic Vote in the 2004 Presidential
Election: Insecurity and Moral Values,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 2, April. See also: Abramowitz, Alan
and Kyle Saunders. 2006. “Exploring the Bases of Partisanship in the American Electorate: Social Identity vs.
Ideology,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol 9, No. 2, (June) and Leal, D. L., Barreto, M. A., Lee, J., & de la Garza,
R. O. (2005). The Latino vote in the 2004 election. PS: Political Science & Politics, 38(1), 41-49.

5
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more welcoming. State senator Russell Pearce and former Sheriff Joe Arpaio can be considered
playing the roles of anti-immigrant issue entrepreneurs in Arizona. Russell Pearce introduces
Senate Bill 1070 which authorizes state and local law enforcement officers to inspect the
citizenship status of anyone appearing suspicious. This culminates after a decade of antiimmigrant policies being advanced by the Arizona legislature. Sheriff Arpaio aggressively
enforced Arizona’s anti-immigrant policies during his tenure in Maricopa County. The increased
white mobilization and perceived hostile legislation in turn raises the sense of threat by the Latino
community who are assumed to move en bloc to the Democratic Party. In contrast, Colorado and
Florida pursue more restrained policy agendas regarding immigration and have widely-respected
Latino political leaders. Federico Pena was mayor of Denver and served in President Obama’s
cabinet and Mel Martinez was elected to the United States Senate from Florida and was a former
chair of the Republican National Committee.
Second, we directly test whether Latino support for the seven referenda and religiosity items
predicts Republican Party affect. We are less interested in the specific point estimates of factors;
instead, we test whether the counterfactual is statistically significant. Specifically, we are keenly
interested in whether the factors measuring Latino support for moral values initiatives and
traditional religious appeals are statistically significant with Republican Party affect.
As a further test of our propositions I estimate a logistic model using the Latino National
Survey (2006) as a test of robustness. The dependent variable is the likelihood of Republican
identification predicted by sets of questions measuring respondents’ social and demographic
characteristics, positions on issues, financial situation, ideology, and perceptions of inequities
between themselves and the majority white population. If the results are consistent with those
from the exit surveys, then we can be more confident about the weakness of traditional values as
a vehicle for partisan conversion.
Moral Values and Polarization
The white and Hispanic populations agree about many national issues, however, there
are nuanced differences. Hispanics appear more concerned with immediate policy problems
connected to issues of social mobility and economic opportunity. The white population
illustrates a slightly greater sensitivity to general policy issues such as national security and taxes.
Table 2 reports the percentage of the white and Hispanic populations who found an issue to be
the most important for their vote in each presidential election. Predictably, the economy and jobs
are important issues for both groups. Second, approximately 16% of Hispanics report moral
values are significant for their presidential vote. Also, the Hispanic community consistently
regards education and health care to be crucial to their vote decision. These differences probably
Hispanics’ greater concern with policies that offer the potential for opportunity and personal
security as well as their economic vulnerability.
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Michael Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla (2003) argue that Hispanics display a preference
towards the Democratic Party even though their partisan loyalty is not as complete as that of
African Americans—some potential sympathy for the Republican Party seems to exist. Recently,
however, the Hispanic population is considered to be emerging as a Democratic bloc. The
Republican Party’s opposition to immigration reflects white “backlash” to the rapid increase in
the Hispanic population in communities (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Hajnal and Rivera 2014).
Is there evidence that Republican sponsorship of perceived hostile immigration-related
legislation contributes to distinctive partisan alignments? We estimate the likelihood that the
white and Hispanic populations in our states identify with the Republican Party from 1996 to
2008 using logistic regression where the dependent variable is party identification (scored 1 for
Republican and 0 for Democrat) predicted by typical indicators of partisan identification. (Refer
to the Technical Appendix for an explanation of the method).
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Figure 1 reports the likelihood that white and Hispanic voters identify with the
Republican Party in each state. The results for Cuban voters in Florida are reported beginning
in the 2000 presidential election—the first year the exit polls distinguish between Hispanic and
Cuban voters. Beginning in 1996, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida illustrate a trend where the
Hispanic community becomes less Republican and white identification grows for the
Republican Party. Cuban voters in Florida identify with the Republican Party about as strongly
as the white population in 2000 but decay over the decade. Cuban voters’ declining fidelity to
the Republican Party appears to be consistent with theories of assimilation by latter-generation
Cubans; younger Cubans are less likely to profess strong commitment to the Republican Party
over their opposition to the Castro regime. There is noticeable state by state variation in
partisan identification. In part, this is likely the result of differing state political, economic, and
social contexts. Yet in each election since 1996 the white population increasingly identifies with
the Republican Party. Furthermore, the Hispanic community continues to move gradually
away from the Republican Party and toward the Democratic Party.
Next, is there evidence that traditional moral values might attract Hispanic voters to
the Republican Party? There are several questions used in our states which permit analysis of
the attraction of traditional religious and cultural issues for Hispanic voters. Arizona (2008),
Colorado (2004), and Florida (2008) all ask voters if they had a born-again experience—an
important indicator of religious traditionalism. Florida placed Amendment 2 on the ballot in
2004 and Arizona listed Proposition 102 on its 2008 ballot which legally defines marriage as a
union between a man and a woman. In 2008 Colorado offered Amendment 48 which legally
defines a “person” to exist at the moment of fertilization. Finally, Florida voters were asked how
frequently they attended church or worship service in 2004. Collectively these states offer seven
instances of either referenda or survey questions that permit a test of whether the Republican
party might attract Hispanic voters due to traditional values.
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Figure 1: Probability of Republican Identification
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Similar to Equation 1, the analysis uses logistic regression to estimate the likelihood that
a voter casts a ballot for the Republican presidential candidate in each election. Republican
presidential vote is predicted by a series of independent variables (depending on which are used
in each exit poll), dichotomous (i.e., dummy) variables used for race and ethnicity, the relevant
variables tapping religiosity and cultural values (i.e., Colorado Amendment 48, etc.) and a series
of interaction terms. The interaction terms show the combined effect of race/ethnicity with the
variables tapping religiosity and traditional family values.
The interaction terms are the variables of most interest because they estimate the effect
between a religious or family value variable and race/ethnicity. Statistically significant interaction
terms indicate that religiosity (church attendance or a born-again experience) and/or a family
value (heterosexual marriage or personhood begins at fertilization) are important for their
respective racial/ethnic group which motivates them to vote Republican. In other words, the test
for the hypothesis that the Republican Party can convert Hispanic (or White) voters is whether
the coefficient for the interaction term is both positive and statistically significant; the specific
point estimates are of less concern.
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Table 4. Likelihood of Republican Presidential Vote – Florida (Logistic Estimates)
Florida 2004
Florida 2008
-.033
-.026
Age
(0.148)
(0.209)
.1509**
.149**
Income
(0.000)
(0.000)
-.604**
Financial Situation
(0.000)
-.148**
-.025
Education
(.005)
(0.616)
.198
Frequency of Church Attendance
(0.121)
.637
Amendment 2 (marriage is between man and woman)
(0.151)
Born again
White
Black
Hispanic/Non-Cuban
Cuban
Other race
White x church attendance
Hispanic x church attendance
Cuban x church attendance

.049
(0.918)
-1.577**
(0.000)
-1.094**
(0.08)
.421
(0.581)
.684
(0.178)
.2281
(0.093)
.3407
(0.06)
.291
(0.225)

White x amendment 2

.194
(0.648)
-2.123**
(0.000)
-.495
(0.356)
.612
(0.217)
.679
(0.264)

Cuban x amendment 2
White x born again
Hispanic (non-Cuban) x born again
Cuban x born again

Pseudo R²
N
Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P (z); * p<.05 ; ** p < .01

-.095**
(0.044)

1.220**
(0.004)
1.124**
(0.005)
-1.584**
(0.000)
.631
(0.175)
1.683**
(0.000)
1.538**
(0.024)

1.657**
(0.000)
.954
(0.108)
1.267**
(0.036)

Hispanic (non-Cuban) x amendment 2

Intercept

Florida 2008
-.043**
(0.024)
.189**
(0.000)

.303
(.553)
0.17
2007

-1.667**
(0.000)
0.26
2575

.019
(0.964)
-.492
(0.378)
-.832
(0.169)
-2.211**
(0.000)
0.12
2521
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Table 4. Likelihood of Republican Presidential Vote (Logistic Estimates)

Age
Income

Arizona
2008
-.042
(0.167)
.125**
(0.002)

Arizona
2008
-.053
(0.118)
.1555**
(0.001)

-.065
(0.390)
-1.016
(0.065)

.121
(0.156)

Financial Situation
Education
Born Again
Arizona Proposition 102
(marriage is union
between man and woman)
White
Black
Hispanic
Other race
White x born again
Hispanic x born again

Colorado
2004
.030
(0.186)
.174**
(0.000)
-.404**
(0.000)
-.251**
(0.000)
-.492
(0.266)

Colorado
2008
.061
(0.092)
.116**
(0.006)

-.413
(0.406)
-1.658**
(0.005)
-1.622**
(0.002)
-.715
(0.239)
1.357**
(0.003)
1.384*
(0.016)

1.634
(0.339)
-1.462
(0.346)
1.377
(0.429)
1.773
(0.292)

-.655
(0.301)
.768
(0.296)
-2.199**
(0.014)
.411
(0.590)
.083
(0.917)
.335
(0.562)
-1.427*
(0.032)

-.345
(0.668)
-2.201*
(0.027)
-.774
(0.370)
-.195
(0.839)

White x Arizona Prop 102

2.012**
(0.002)

Hispanic x Arizona Prop 102

.698
(0.351)

Colorado Amendment 48
(‘person’ begins at
moment of fertilization)

-2.437*
(0.038)

White x CO Amend 48
Hispanic x CO Amend 48
-.301
.719
(0.558)
(0.838)
.12
.25
Pseudo R²
N
994
1015
Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P (z); * p<.05 ; ** p < .01
Intercept

-.192**
(0.007)

1.982*
(0.043)
.16
2074

-.212
(0.858)
-1.273
(0.314)
2.218
(0.243)
.17
1003
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Consistent with other research, in every election the likelihood of voting Republican
increases as household income increases. Education, too, mostly conforms to expectations. In
most elections, higher levels of education indicate greater support for Democratic presidential
candidates. Respondents’ age, however, is not significant in most models. The explanation might
be age crosscuts other issues and divisions in these particular electorates.
The results from the interaction terms provide inconsistent-to-weak support for the
hypothesis that religiosity increases Hispanic support for the Republican Party. Of the seven
elections analyzed the interaction term for Hispanics was significant in only two—church
attendance for Florida in 2004 and having a born-again experience in Colorado in 2004. Both
states were won by George W. Bush. The interaction term for Hispanics and ‘born again’ is
significant in Arizona in 2008, however, the sign is negative indicating support for the
Democratic Party. The only factors with statistical significance for Republican presidential vote
are limited to traditional indicators of religious commitment.
Arizona and Florida placed constitutional amendments on their state ballots which
legally define marriage as the union between a male and female. Favoring traditional marriage is
strongly supported and statistically significant among white voters in both states. The coefficients
in both instances are quite large indicating support for traditional marriage exerts a substantial
influence on white support for the Republican Party. Similarly, Cuban respondents in Florida
strongly favor traditional definitions of marriage. In contrast, the interaction term fails the test
of statistical significance for non-Cuban Hispanics in both states—traditional marriage does not
influence the partisan choice of non-Cuban Hispanics. Gay marriage, of course, is an issue
undergoing rapid evolution in public opinion although Republican attitudes were relatively more
fixed in 2008 compared to 2014.
Colorado Amendment 48 legally defined a person to exist at the moment of fertilization.
Interestingly, Amendment 48 does not achieve statistical significance for either white or
Hispanic voters. Importantly, again, an indicator of traditional values does not appear to
motivate Hispanic voters to consider the Republican Party.
The results are even less encouraging for the Republican Party when re-estimating
Equation 2 for the likelihood that voters claim Republican Party affiliation. Only one interaction
term is significant for Hispanics. The interaction term for Hispanic voters and born-again is
statistically significant in Colorado in 2004. All other interaction terms using religious or moral
values referenda fail to demonstrate any evidence of converting Hispanics to Republican Party
identification—even in Colorado and Florida where their state environments are more
welcoming and Hispanic movement to the Democratic Party is weaker compared to Arizona.
Conversely, the interaction terms for white voters are consistently significant predictors
of Republican identification: the importance of being born again is significant for white voters in
Colorado in 2004, traditional marriage is significant in Arizona and Florida in 2008, life begins
at the moment of fertilization in Colorado in 2008, and frequent church attendance in Florida
in 2004.
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Table 5. Likelihood of Republican Identification – Florida (Logistic Estimates)

Age
Income
Financial Situation
Education
Frequency of Church Attendance

Florida
2004
-.026
(0.262)
.206***
(0.000)
-.527***
(0.000)
-.079
(0.13)
-.185
(0.185)

Amendment 2 (marriage is
between man and woman)
Born again
White
Black
Hispanic/Non-Cuban
Cuban
Other race
White x church attendance
Hispanic x church attendance
Cuban x church attendance

Florida
2008
-.026
(0.209)
.1499***
(0.000)

Florida
2008
-.043**
(0.02)
.189***
(0.000)

-.025
(0.61)

-.095**
(0.04)

.637
(0.15)

-.793*
(0.06)
-1.434***
(0.002)
-1.133*
(0.06)
.477
(0.338)
-.020
(0.97)
0.412***
(.002)
.148
(0.44)
.134
(0.419)

White x amendment 2
Hispanic (non-Cuban) x
Amendment 2
Cuban x Amendment 2

.194
(0.64)
-2.123***
(0.000)
-.495
(0.35)
.612
(0.217)
.679
(0.26)

1.657***
(0.000)
.954
(0.108)
1.267**
(0.03)

White x born again
Hispanic (non-Cuban) x born again
Cuban x born again
Intercept

.037
(0.937)
Pseudo R²
0.14
N
2041
Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P (z); * p<.05 ; ** p < .01

1.22***
(0.004)
1.124***
(0.005)
-1.58***
(0.000)
.631
(0.175)
1.683***
(0.000)
1.583**
(0.02)

-1.66***
(0.000)
0.26
2575

0.019
(0.964)
-.492
(0.378)
-.832
(0.169)
-2.21***
(0.000)
0.12
2521
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Table 5. Likelihood of Republican Identification – Arizona and Colorado (Logistic Estimates)
Arizona 2008
Age

-.042
(0.167)

Arizona
2008
-0.059*
(0.061)

Income

.286***
(0.004)

.295***
(0.004)

0.146***
(0.000)

.179***
(0.000)

.033
(0.677)

-0.451***
(0.000)
-0.103**
(0.03)

-0.192***
(0.009)

Financial Situation
Education

-0.053
(0.487)

Born Again

-.598
(0.282)

Colorado
2004
-0.003
(0.874)

Colorado 2008
0.055
(0.13)

-0.180
(0.714)
-.823
(0.217)

Arizona Proposition 102 (marriage is union
between man and woman)
White

0.892
(0.276)

.0908
(0.91)

-0.731
(0.138)

12.159
(0.98)

Black

-1.159
(0.213)

-1.44
(0.14)

-1.851***
(0.002)

11.807
(0.983)

Hispanic

-0.437
(0.61)

-.510
(0.58)

-2.039***
(0.000)

11.047
(0.984)

Other race

0.188
(0.833)

-0.249
(0.80)

-1.225**
(0.05)

12.148
(0.983)

White x born again

0.543
(0.35)

1.202**
(0.018)

Hispanic x born again

.617
(0.381)

1.402**
(0.026)
1.113*
(0.10)
0.019
(.981)

White x Arizona Prop 102
Hispanic x Arizona Prop 102
Colorado Amendment 48 (‘person’ begins at
moment of fertilization)

-0.268
(0.773)

White x CO Amend 48

-.260
(0.857)

1.004
(0.33)

2.036**
(0.31)
1.567
(0.168)
-13.921
(0.98)

0.16
1040

0.13
2091

0.14
1028

Hispanic x CO Amend 48
Intercept

-0.593
(0.646)

0.10
Pseudo R²
1018
N
Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P (z); * p<.05 ; ** p < .01
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Together the results are more consistent with the view of increasing polarization between
the Republican and Democratic electoral coalitions. We believe the Republican Party is
increasingly dominated by white voters in high-Hispanic growth states where the Democratic
Party appeals to racial and ethnic minorities. Our findings provide weak support at best for the
RNC’s ability to attract Hispanic voters through traditional moral appeals. To the contrary,
these appeals appear to resonate mostly with white voters, reinforcing the growing distance
between the two groups in American politics. Nor does it seem that even if the Republican Party
finds a way to move beyond the immigration issue that their appeal to Hispanic voters will
improve. The above evidence for Arizona, Colorado, and Florida suggests that the trajectory is
Hispanic voters are settling into Democratic Party allegiance. Of course, simple plurality electoral
rules mean many elections in the United States can be won with relatively small movements of
voters; marginal improvement by the Republican Party among Hispanic voters can be enough to
win particular elections. At the same time, the trend appears to be one of an increasing
attachment to the Democratic Party by Hispanic voters.
Test for Robustness using the Latino National Survey (2006)
The results from the referenda offer little evidence that the Republican Party can use
appeals to traditional moral values and religion to convert Latino voters. Even the more
temperate states of Colorado and Florida provide little support that these issues activate favorable
Latino affect. As an additional test I use the Latino National Survey (LNS) from 2006 as a test
for robustness. The LNS roughly corresponds to the time interval for the referenda.
Therefore, it is administered during the similar national context regarding immigration and the
Republican Party’s appeals to religion and social issues to attract conservative voters. Further, the
LNS offers more issues and respondent characteristics. Generally, the results from the LNS are
consistent with the evidence produced from the state-level exit polls.
The approach is similar to that of the earlier models. I use logistic regression to estimate
the likelihood that a respondent identifies as a Republican (1) or a Democrat (0). Partisanship is
predicted by factors organized into four conceptual domains: (1) standard demographic variables
including age, education, marital status, household income, and gender, (2) variables used to
measure religiosity and traditional social values such as the frequency of church attendance,
whether the respondent had a born again experience, should a woman be the primary care giver
for children, attitudes toward same sex marriage, and whether abortion is permitted under any
condition, (3) issues of immediate concern and general philosophical orientations toward the
role of government including support for the DREAM Act, national health care, equal spending
across public school districts, support for school vouchers, and personal financial situation, and
(4) characteristics of immigrant groups including citizenship and national origin coded as
dummy variables. The issue variables and religious indicators are coded such that positive
coefficients correspond to Republican leaning. Two additional variables of interest are included
in the model. The relationship between ideology and partisan identification is clear and strong
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for Anglos who inherit their party affiliation from their parents. The process might be different
for immigrant groups because they do not have an American partisan identity to inherit. Hence,
the direct effect of ideology is estimated in the model. Also included is the degree to which
Latinos believe they share similar experiences regarding job opportunities, educational access, and
income mobility with other minority groups such as African Americans. If Latinos see themselves
sharing more in common with African Americans regarding the opportunities for personal
advancement then Republican appeals to traditional values logically will be less effective,
especially in the absence of strong ideological predispositions.
At best, the results from the Latino National Survey offer mixed support that appeals to
traditional religious and moral values provide modest leverage for Latino Republican
identification. Frequent church attendance is not statistically significant, and a born-again
experience predicts Democratic identification. Even the typically powerful abortion issue is not
statistically significant. Also, the belief that government should redistribute resources to equalize
school funding across districts moves Latinos to the Democratic Party. National origin—except
for Cubans—and attitudes toward immigration policy measured by support for the Dream Act
are significant and nudge Latino voters to the Democratic Party. Interestingly, access to
education measured by favoring vouchers and opposition to same sex marriage do increase the
likelihood that Latinos identify with the Republican Party. This suggests the possibility that an
agenda of selective conservative issues can gain some support although it must include positions
on issues providing opportunity instead of solely traditional values.
The separate effects for ideology and Latinos’ shared experiences with other minorities
reinforce the view that everyday issues of life are more important than traditional values.
Ideology predicts Latino partisan identification. However, 28% of Latinos answered they do not
think in left-right ideological terms and 8% reported they do not embrace an ideology. This is
consistent with the idea that immigrants evaluate politics using a different calculus. Their
encounters with the political and social world might well be more important compared to Anglo
voters who largely inherit their partisan identification. Second, Latinos who believe they share
similar experiences with African Americans regarding diminished opportunity is powerful and
predicts Democratic identification. This supports the idea that Latino political behavior is
motivated by issues affecting their immediate life. In short, the test for robustness is consistent
with the conclusion that traditional social values and religious appeals offer only weak support
for the belief that Latino voters are available for conversion to the Republican Party. For the
Republican Party to convert potential Latino voters requires fundamentally refocusing the
party’s agenda and abandoning its hostile posture.
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Table 6 - Likelihood of Republican Identification Latino National Survey 2006
Central and South America
Mexican
Cuban
Puerto Rican/Dominican Republic
Citizen
Church attendance
Born again
Same Sex marriage
Abortion
Dream Act

-2.649**
(1.3301)
-1.042*
(0.594)
1.535*
(.913)
-0.546
(0.686)
0.267
(0.528)
0.085
(0.184)
-0.786*
(0.430)
0.771***
(0.310)
0.228
(0.254)
-0.328*
(0.174)

Health care

0.057
(0.214)
Equal funding for schools
-0.646***
(0.264)
School vouchers
0.329*
(0.178)
Mother care for kids
-0.161
(0.132)
0.413
Married
(0.499)
0.227*
Education
(0.141)
0.034
Household income
(0.122)
Gender
-0.144
(0.394)
Age
-0.017
(0.014)
0.680**
Financial situation
(0.274)
-1.186***
Ideology
(0.320)
Common with African Americans
-0.341*
(0.212)
Constant
-0.448
(2.696)
Pseudo R²
0.332
N
258
Omitted category is “Hispanic from other countries” *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (standard error)
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Discussion
Can appeals to traditional social values help the Republican Party convert Hispanic
voters in high-growth states? The results suggest that Hispanic voters do not respond to religious
and moral value positions in the political arena. Indeed, the likelihood that Hispanic and white
voters identify with the Republican Party have been diverging from each other since 1996. The
most dramatic change occurs in Arizona which adopted the most restrictive anti-immigrant
legislation. However, even in Florida and Colorado where the state responses are more mixed,
there is consistent movement by Hispanic voters away from the Republican Party.
What does this imply about the importance of religion for minority politics? One
possibility is that economically and socially marginalized voters weigh issues differently compared
to white voters. Barreto and Segura (2014) seem correct when arguing that Hispanic voters are
more concerned about issues addressing their immediate economic security rather than religious
appeals. A second possibility is that conceptualizations of ‘God,’ religion, social suffering, and
moral issues are different for minority citizens who might connect religion with social justice
outcomes. Religious appeals may reinforce a collective identity of social suffering and injustice
that interprets hardship as a pathway to God instead of God becoming one’s personal savior
(Horner and Martinez 2015). Hence, religious appeals that resonate with comparatively
advantaged white voters may not ring similarly with Hispanic voters. In fact, religious primes may
inspire the desire for a larger role of government as a way of reducing unjust inequities. Yet,
Latinos’ weak ideological predisposition and focus on issues that advance their economic and
social opportunity suggest they could become an important swing constituency under the right
configuration of issues. These results suggest that if the Republican Party wishes to attract
potential Latino voters then it needs to adjust its policy positions away from an agenda of limited
government, lower taxes, and personal liberty. Instead the Republican Party must embrace
positions that tangibly responds to personal well-being and opportunity as well as abandon its
hostile posture.
What explains Latino support for George Bush in 2004? Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler
(2008) argue that moral values and national security concerns motivated 40% of the Latino vote
for President Bush. National anxiety over terrorism following the September 11 attacks
combined with Republican exploitation of national security issues likely contributed to some
portion of his Latino vote. I am less convinced that moral values is a primary causal factor that
moved Latinos to support President Bush. Instead, it might be more likely that President Bush’s
personal outreach to Hispanic voters and his record as governor of Texas mobilized Latino
support. Or Latino support for President Bush reflects candidate-centered characteristics in
national elections rather than the potential for the conversion of significant numbers of voters to
the Republican Party. In either case the results call attention to the need for additional research
at the state-level in order to better understand minority political behavior.
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Finally, the rhetoric and policy positions of Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential
election campaign and as president reinforces the likelihood that Latinos will solidify around the
Democratic Party. Candidate Trump clearly seemed uninterested in the RNC’s
recommendation for welcoming rhetoric and appeals to family values; President Trump’s
strategy seems designed to strengthen the existing partisan divisions in the United States.
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Technical Appendix

Equation 1:
The test for whether moral values has the potential to attract Hispanic voters is expressed as the
following function for relevant election years as,

when,
L = predicted logit (Republican presidential vote = 1, Democrat =0), Age = age of respondent,
Income = household income,
Education = respondent educational level,
Financial Situation =whether respondent’s financial condition has improved or worsened,
Born Again = has respondent had a born-again experience,
Marriage = state referenda defining marriage only between male and female, Person = legal
definition of ‘person’ begins at fertilization,
Attend = frequency of church attendance from rarely attends to more than once per week;
Interaction white = interaction term for white dummy and relevant independent variable, i.e.,
marriage, person, born again, attend,
Interaction Hispanic = interaction term for non/Cuban Hispanic dummy and relevant
independent variables (marriage, person, born-again, attend), and
Interaction Cuban = interaction term for Cuban dummy and relevant independent variables
(marriage, person, born again, attend).
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